How India can build integrated manufacturing clusters

China, Vietnam and Taiwan each turned a single accountable entity into their electronics manufacturing edge, not incentives alone. India's own version, the BHAVYA scheme, was approved this March. Here is what the model actually requires, and which of India's six competing state corridors is likeliest to get there first.

Key takeaways

• Suzhou, VSIP and Shenzhen/Hsinchu all trace back to one accountable vehicle building shared infrastructure and services, not to incentives alone.
• India has already run four smaller versions of this experiment, Special Economic Zones, the National Investment and Manufacturing Zones, the MSME Cluster Development Programme and AMTZ, and PM MITRA, and governance, not incentive design, is what separated the ones that worked from the ones that didn't.
• BHAVYA, approved in March 2026, is India's first national attempt to build this vehicle at scale: 100 parks targeted by FY32, an SPV for each, national equity capped at 50%.
• Of six state corridors chasing an integrated electronics cluster, only two currently hold a central semiconductor-mission approval; the rest are still converting announcements into approvals.
• The likeliest failure mode is not incentive design, it is land acquisition, deal bankability and single-anchor dependence, risks that have already cost two states a marquee investment each.

Why clusters, and not just factories

A factory solves one firm's production problem. A cluster solves an industry's. The distinction sounds semantic until you look at what a single mid-sized manufacturer has to build before it can ship a product: its own compliance function, its own testing setup, its own logistics contracts, its own effluent treatment, often its own worker housing. Michael Porter's original formulation of industry clusters describes geographic concentrations of interconnected firms, specialised suppliers and supporting institutions that compete but also cooperate, reducing the transaction costs of frequent dealings between firms and enabling specialisation that no single company could sustain in isolation.^[1] The practical version of that idea, for a country trying to industrialise quickly, is simpler still: build the shared infrastructure once, and let many firms rent into it.

China's manufacturing map is a portfolio of exactly this logic applied industry by industry. Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Dongguan together form the core of China's export-oriented electronics assembly base, with Shenzhen the anchor for Guangdong province's integrated-circuit and semiconductor output.^[2] Foshan, next door, is China's furniture capital; Dongguan doubles as a toy and plastics hub; Shanghai anchors biopharmaceuticals. None of this happened by accident of geography alone. Each cluster was seeded, subsidised and serviced by government at some stage, usually multiple levels of it at once.

That last point matters for India specifically, because India's federal structure already allows a version of this stacking that unitary systems cannot: central schemes such as production-linked incentives and customs facilitation can be layered directly on top of state land, power and stamp-duty concessions, on the same site, for the same firm. The constraint has not been the availability of incentives. It has been the absence of a vehicle that aggregates them, builds the shared infrastructure around them, and stays accountable for both once construction is over.

There is also a cost argument that has quietly shifted in India's favour. A DPIIT-commissioned NCAER report released in 2025 put India's logistics cost at 7.97% of GDP in FY24, down from 8.84% the year before, well below China's 14.4% in 2023, replacing an older and less rigorous estimate of 13 to 14% that had shaped policy thinking for years.^[3] That does not make India cheaper than China on every input. It does mean the logistics penalty that used to be cited as a reason clusters could not work here is smaller than assumed, and shared logistics infrastructure inside a cluster can close most of the remaining gap.

What the leading clusters actually did

Suzhou Industrial Park is the clearest illustration of the model, because its ownership structure changed in public. When China and Singapore launched it in 1994, the joint-venture holding company was split 65:35 in Singapore's favour, reflecting how much of the master-planning and management expertise Singapore was expected to contribute. In 1999, with a rival zone under the same city government pulling tenants away, Singapore and China agreed to rebalance the stake to 35:65 in China's favour, a change that took effect in January 2001. The park did not fail because incentives were wrong. It struggled while ownership sat with the party least able to move local approvals, and it recovered once that changed.^[13] By 2019, the park was generating roughly 274 billion RMB in GDP, hosting thousands of tenant companies across a mix of domestic and foreign-funded projects, and had crossed a cumulative $1 trillion in trade.^[13]

Vietnam took the same architecture and simply repeated it. VSIP, a joint venture between Vietnam's Becamex IDC and Singapore's Sembcorp, has been replicated in more than 25 locations since its first park opened in Binh Duong in 1996, now covering roughly 14,500 hectares, hosting more than 1,000 investors, and drawing over $31 billion in registered capital across more than 350,000 jobs.^[14] The lesson from VSIP is different from Suzhou's: not that governance can be corrected mid-flight, but that once a format is proven, discipline in repeating it beats redesigning each new park from scratch.

Set against these, Shenzhen looks like the exception, an organically grown cluster rather than a planned one. It is not, quite. Shenzhen's rise began with its 1980 designation as one of China's first Special Economic Zones, a deliberate national policy choice that seeded the tax and trade privileges around which private electronics manufacturing later agglomerated. Taiwan's Hsinchu Science Park makes the same point from a different government: established by the Taiwan state in December 1980, it seeded the foundry model directly, both of Taiwan's top two semiconductor manufacturers trace back to the government's Industrial Technology Research Institute, and the park now hosts more than 500 high-tech companies.^[15] The lesson from both is not "clusters emerge naturally." It is that even the most successful "organic" cluster needed a state to remove the first set of obstacles before market forces could take over.

India has already run smaller versions of this experiment

The temptation in Indian policy debates is to treat the cluster model as untested here. It is not. India has run at least four variants, two that struggled, two that are working, and the difference between them is diagnostic.

Special Economic Zones are the cautionary case. Only about 37% of India's approved SEZ land is actually in use nationally, leaving around 20,000 hectares of land and 10 crore square feet of built-up area standing vacant as of February 2022, and only 267 of the 427 approved zones are operational at all.^[4] Research on the programme has found that firm productivity rises inside privately run SEZs but declines in publicly run ones, consistent with political interference and rent-seeking crowding out commercial discipline in zones where no single accountable operator has skin in the game.^[5] The National Investment and Manufacturing Zones announced under the 2011 National Manufacturing Policy, which targeted 25% of GDP from manufacturing and 100 million new jobs within a decade, mostly did not reach the scale envisaged.^[6] Governance was not the only cause: the Centre's own later imposition of Minimum Alternate Tax and Dividend Distribution Tax on SEZ units removed much of what made the tax status attractive in the first place, a policy reversal rather than an execution failure.^[6] But governance was still the larger cause. Neither policy failed only for lack of incentives. Both failed, above all, for lack of an entity structured, financed and staffed to make the incentives usable.

Set against that, two India-grown models are working at smaller scale. The Ministry of MSME's Cluster Development Programme has funded more than 1,018 interventions across 29 states and one union territory, building common facility centres for testing, training, effluent treatment and shared production processes, with government grants covering a majority of project cost, rising further for clusters that are majority micro, women-owned or SC/ST-owned.^[7] It is, in effect, a proof of concept for shared services at MSME scale, just not yet built into a fully integrated, plug-and-play campus. AMTZ, the Andhra Pradesh MedTech Zone in Visakhapatnam, is closer to that fuller model: a 270-acre park with common manufacturing and scientific facilities, testing labs run in partnership with an international certification body covering biocompatibility and electrical-safety standards, and enough real capacity that press reports from the pandemic period put its tenants' peak daily output at more than 100 ventilators, 500 oxygen concentrators and roughly a million RT-PCR test kits.^[8]

A third category is worth noting precisely because it did not wait for a government SPV at all: the privately developed, multi-product township. Sri City in Andhra Pradesh, built by a private promoter across more than 7,500 acres, bundles a multi-product SEZ, a domestic tariff zone, a free-trade and warehousing zone and an electronics manufacturing cluster on one site, and now hosts more than 220 operational companies, Kellogg's, Mondelez, Colgate-Palmolive and Isuzu among them.^[9] Reliance's Model Economic Township in Jhajjar, Haryana, spans 8,250 acres, India's largest privately developed industrial township, and hosts a formally designated Japanese Industrial Township within it, anchoring Panasonic and Denso alongside other Japanese manufacturers, inside a wider township Reliance's own disclosures now put at more than 600 companies overall.^[10] Neither needed a bilateral treaty or a national scheme to build the plug-and-play stack this piece describes; a private developer with patient capital and a credible masterplan did it instead. The SPV is one route to this model, evidently not the only one, though it is the route that scales fastest when the state wants to pick the location rather than wait for a developer to choose it.

The live experiment to watch is PM MITRA, the textile parks scheme. It explicitly offers three delivery models and is letting states self-select: a PPP master-developer model, a hybrid PPP/EPC model, and a government SPV-led model in which the state holds 51% and the Centre 49%, with some states running theirs through state implementing agencies instead.^[11] The Centre is backing this with up to ₹500 crore per greenfield park (₹200 crore for brownfield) plus a ₹300 crore competitive incentive for early operationalisation, against a total outlay of ₹4,445 crore for seven parks through 2027-28.^[11] Within two or three years, India will have real comparative data on which of the three governance models actually delivers, inside one country, one incentive structure, one time period. That is a more useful natural experiment than any cross-country comparison.

All of this sits inside the larger National Industrial Corridor Development Programme, which now spans 11 corridors and has had 12 new industrial cities approved across 10 states, anchored by the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor's roughly $100 billion, 1,500-kilometre footprint across six states.^[12] The corridor programme provides the connective infrastructure; it is not, on its own, a cluster model, because it does not bundle shared technical services the way AMTZ or a well-run SPV does. The two need to be read together.

BHAVYA: the national-scale answer, approved in March 2026

On 18 March 2026, the Union Cabinet approved Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna, BHAVYA, India's first attempt to build this model at national scale rather than case by case. Operating guidelines followed on 23 May 2026.^[17]

BHAVYA is not a merger of India's existing park programmes. PM MITRA and the National Industrial Corridor Development Programme continue in parallel, and the guidelines require pending issues in either to be resolved before a fresh BHAVYA application on the same site.¹⁶ Nor is it restricted to a single sector: the scoring rewards a sectoral focus without mandating one. That flexibility is also where the design questions start.

1. Does the equity cap protect state accountability, or just cap national skin in the game? BHAVYA fixes the national entity's stake at up to 50%, the same ceiling Suzhou crossed only after its 1999 correction shifted control the other way. Specific fix: track, park by park, whether the operating decisions, not just the paid-up equity, sit with whichever partner is actually approving land and utilities locally.
2. Will a sectoral preference become a sectoral commitment, or stay diffuse? The guidelines score sectoral parks favourably but do not require a single-sector focus. Specific fix: an electronics-focused SPV should say so in its founding documents and staff its shared-services stack accordingly, testing labs, customs desks, skilling, rather than build generic infrastructure and hope the right tenants self-select.
3. Does land-value-linked equity solve the acquisition problem, or just relocate it? States and private developers post land as their equity stake, which only works if that land is actually assembled and clear of dispute. Specific fix: publish a park's land-acquisition status, assembled, contested or pending, before it is scored in challenge mode, not after.

What strategy India should adopt inside the BHAVYA framework

Start product-specific

The case for making BHAVYA's first electronics park product-specific rather than multi-product starts with where India's growth has actually concentrated. Domestic electronics production rose from roughly Rs 1.9 lakh crore in FY15 to Rs 11.3 lakh crore in FY25, a nearly sixfold increase, growing at close to 19.78% a year between FY21 and FY24 alone.¹⁷ But almost all of that growth sits in one category. Mobile phones went from about 10% of production value in FY15 to 44% in FY24, while consumer electronics fell from 29% to 11% and industrial electronics from 21% to 11% over the same period.¹⁷

Assembly scaled. The layer beneath it, components, has not kept pace, a gap this publication has covered in more depth in its earlier essentials on the PCB and components layer, on smartphone-assembly-led growth, and on the EMS sector's trajectory. A cluster built around one product family, rather than a generic multi-sector industrial park, is what let Suzhou concentrate testing and compliance infrastructure specific to electronics rather than infrastructure generic enough to serve any tenant equally badly.

Make it genuinely plug and play

Plug and play is a marketing phrase until it is tested against what a mid-sized supplier actually has to build today: its own compliance filings, its own effluent treatment, its own logistics contracts, sometimes its own worker housing. A cluster earns the phrase only when a new tenant can skip building all of these and simply lease into a campus where they already exist.

BHAVYA's guidelines fund exactly this layer, core infrastructure, value-added infrastructure and social infrastructure, at up to Rs 1 crore an acre, which is the right unit of funding only if the SPV actually builds shared testing labs and a compliance single window rather than treating the money as a subsidy for basic roads and drainage a state would have built anyway.

Who should build it

BHAVYA answers "who should build it" with the same tri-partite logic as Suzhou and VSIP (Chart 1), formalised through NICDIT, the National Industrial Corridor Development and Implementation Trust, as the capped national equity holder, and NICDC, the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation, as a separate project management agency that does not hold equity at all.¹⁶ Splitting funding from delivery this way is closer to VSIP's model, where Sembcorp's operating discipline stayed distinct from Becamex's land and political relationships, than to a single fused entity trying to do both jobs at once.

The probable locations for an integrated electronics cluster

Six state corridors are now positioned to compete for BHAVYA's first electronics-specific park, though "compete" understates how differently placed they actually are. Of the six compared here, only Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh currently hold a central India Semiconductor Mission approval of scale; Andhra Pradesh holds one for a smaller assembly-and-test project; Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Telangana hold none, despite each having a dedicated state policy and, in two cases, a headline anchor announcement that has since moved to a rival state or paused entirely.¹⁸ The investment figures below are drawn from company and government announcements rather than audited disclosure, and should be read with that caveat throughout.

None of this happens in a vacuum. The same pool of anchor capital that Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh are courting is also being courted by Vietnam, Mexico and Malaysia, and by some measures India is not winning that wider contest yet. Vietnam drew $27.6 billion in disbursed FDI in 2025, with Samsung and Hana Micron both expanding packaging capacity there; Malaysia already runs an estimated 13% of global outsourced semiconductor assembly and test capacity through Intel, Infineon and Micron, well ahead of where India's own OSAT lines will reach comparable volume; Mexico's duty-free access to the US market under USMCA is an advantage no Indian state can offer.²⁵ The six-way contest among Indian states is real, but it sits inside a larger contest India itself has not yet clearly won.

What could still go wrong

The clearest illustration of what can go wrong is not hypothetical, it has already happened twice. Maharashtra courted the Vedanta-Foxconn joint venture for a 1,100-acre site at Talegaon, reportedly worth close to $20 billion, only for the venture to sign with Gujarat instead in September 2022, a decision that became a political controversy in its own right; Foxconn exited the joint venture entirely the following year. Telangana separately signed a memorandum with Kaynes Technology in 2023 for a Rs 2,800 crore OSAT facility at Kongara Kalan, which instead materialised as Kaynes Semicon in Sanand, Gujarat, inaugurated in March 2026.²¹ Both cases share a pattern: an early, well-publicised memorandum of understanding is not the same as a bankable project with land assembled, and the gap between the two is where a state's chances quietly move to a competitor.²⁴

Land acquisition and SPV bankability are the mechanical version of the same risk. A BHAVYA SPV's equity is meant to be backed partly by the land value a state or developer contributes, which only works if that land is actually assembled and free of dispute before the SPV is capitalised; a challenge-mode process that scores parks on paper before land status is verified risks repeating the SEZ experience of large approved footprints that never convert into built, tenanted space. Financing discipline matters just as much: Maharashtra's Adani-Tower Semiconductor talks, a proposed $10 billion facility, were paused in 2025 over disagreement on financial commitment and demand uncertainty, not over incentives, and a Maharashtra OSAT facility that did open, run by RRP Electronics, is tied to a separately listed entity, RRP Semiconductor Limited, now the subject of a SEBI investigation into stock-price manipulation so severe that regulators barred dozens of entities including its promoters.²¹ Neither failure was a policy design problem. Both were failures to underwrite a specific deal before celebrating the announcement of it.

The last risk is external and outside any single state's control: the same capital being courted by six Indian corridors is also being courted by Vietnam, Mexico and Malaysia, and a cluster that wins its domestic contest can still lose the larger one.

Sources

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